Colombia and the Global Rise of Populism

On 1 August 2026, Colombia elected a far-right populist president in one of the most consequential elections in Latin American history. The winner, backed by US President Donald Trump, campaigned on promises of cracking down on crime, fighting corruption, and restoring traditional values. The result sent shockwaves across the region and added Colombia to a growing list of countries where populist, nationalist movements are gaining power.

Colombia has traditionally been one of the most stable democracies in Latin America, with a strong two-party system and close ties to the United States. The election of a far-right leader represents a dramatic departure from the country's political centre and reflects a pattern that is visible across the world — from Europe to the Americas to parts of Asia.

The rise of populist leaders is not a regional phenomenon — it is a global one. In the United States, Donald Trump won back the presidency in 2024. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni leads a right-wing coalition government. In Argentina, Javier Milei won the presidency on a radical libertarian platform. In India, Narendra Modi has consolidated power with a Hindu nationalist agenda. In Europe, parties like Reform UK, France's National Rally, and Germany's Alternative for Germany have surged in polls and elections.

What connects these movements across different countries and cultures? Why are voters in such different places choosing similar types of leaders? And what does this trend mean for democracy, human rights, and international cooperation? These are among the most important questions in global politics today.

The rise of populism is driven by genuine grievances that mainstream political parties have failed to address. Understanding these grievances is essential for understanding why so many people are choosing radical alternatives.

Economic frustration is the most commonly cited factor. In many countries, wages have stagnated while the cost of housing, healthcare, and education has risen sharply. The benefits of globalisation and technological progress have been unevenly distributed — with highly educated professionals in major cities doing well, while working-class communities in smaller towns and rural areas have seen their industries decline, their jobs disappear, and their living standards fall. For these voters, mainstream parties that promised prosperity but delivered precarity feel like part of the problem, not the solution.

Immigration is another powerful driver. In Europe and the United States, large-scale immigration has become one of the most divisive political issues of the century. Populist leaders have been extraordinarily effective at connecting economic anxiety to immigration — arguing that immigrants take jobs, suppress wages, strain public services, and threaten national identity. Whether or not these claims are supported by evidence, they resonate powerfully with voters who feel that their concerns have been dismissed or ignored by mainstream politicians.

Cultural anxiety plays a role too. Rapid social change — around gender identity, racial equality, religious diversity, and traditional values — has left many voters feeling that the world they grew up in is disappearing. Populist leaders offer a simple, emotionally compelling message: we will protect your way of life against the forces that are trying to change it.

Finally, there is a deep and widespread distrust of institutions — governments, media, experts, and international organisations. Populist leaders exploit this distrust, positioning themselves as outsiders who will fight the corrupt establishment on behalf of ordinary people.

Despite their differences, populist leaders around the world tend to use remarkably similar strategies. Understanding these strategies is important for anyone who wants to think critically about the political messages they encounter.

The first strategy is simplification. Complex problems are reduced to simple narratives with clear villains — immigrants, the elite, the media, the previous government, international institutions. The appeal of simplification is powerful: in a world that feels confusing and threatening, the promise that one person or one policy can fix everything is deeply attractive, even when it is unrealistic.

The second strategy is division. Populist leaders divide society into "the people" and "the enemy" — and define both in ways that serve their agenda. "The people" are the hardworking, honest majority. "The enemy" is whoever the leader needs to blame — journalists, judges, academics, minorities, or foreign governments. This us-versus-them framing creates intense loyalty among supporters and makes criticism of the leader feel like an attack on "the people" themselves.

The third strategy is the erosion of democratic norms. Once in power, populist leaders frequently attack the institutions that are designed to hold them accountable — the courts, the free press, independent regulators, and parliamentary oversight. They do this not by abolishing these institutions outright, but by undermining their credibility, replacing their leaders with loyalists, and portraying any opposition as illegitimate.

The fourth strategy is emotional communication. Populist leaders communicate through emotion rather than policy detail. They use rallies, social media, and direct language that bypasses traditional media and connects directly with supporters. The content is often less important than the feeling — anger, pride, fear, belonging.

The global rise of populism raises urgent questions about the future of democracy. Some analysts argue that populism is a temporary reaction to specific economic and social conditions — and that once those conditions improve, voters will return to mainstream politics. Others argue that something more fundamental has changed, and that the era of centrist, consensus-based democracy that defined the late 20th century is over.

The optimistic view is that populism, for all its dangers, is also a corrective. It forces mainstream parties to listen to voters they have ignored, to address grievances they have dismissed, and to reconnect with communities they have abandoned. The anger that drives populism is not irrational — it is a response to real failures of governance. If mainstream parties learn from these failures, democracy can emerge stronger.

The pessimistic view is that populism, once it takes root, is difficult to reverse. Leaders who erode democratic institutions, normalise division, and concentrate power create conditions that make it harder for democracy to function — which in turn creates more frustration, which benefits more populists. This downward spiral, visible in countries from Hungary to Venezuela, is the greatest risk.

What is clear is that the old assumption — that liberal democracy would spread inevitably across the world — has been decisively challenged. Democracy is not a destination that, once reached, is permanent. It is a system that must be actively maintained, defended, and adapted to changing circumstances.

The Colombian election is one more data point in a global trend. Whether that trend leads to the renewal of democracy or its erosion depends on choices that citizens, leaders, and institutions make in the years ahead. Understanding populism — its causes, its strategies, and its consequences — is essential preparation for making those choices wisely.